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The Quantified Argument Calculus and 
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ABSTRACT. The formalisation of Natural Language arguments in a formal language close to it in 
syntax has been a central aim of Moss’s Natural Logic. I examine how the Quantified Argument 
Calculus (Quarc) can handle the inferences Moss has considered. I show that they can be 
incorporated in existing versions of Quarc or in straightforward extensions of it, all within sound 
and complete systems. Moreover, Quarc is closer in some respects to Natural Language than are 
Moss’s systems – for instance, is does not use negative nouns. The process also sheds light on 
formal properties and presuppositions of some inferences it formalises. Directions for future 
work are outlined. 
KEYWORDS. Quantified Argument Calculus; Natural Logic; formalisation of Natural Language 
arguments; conjunctive predicates; comparative adjectives; defining clauses; comparative 
quantifiers; negative nouns. 
Introduction 
Despite the successes of the Predicate Calculus, based on Frege’s Begriffsschrift (Frege 1879), there 
have been recurrent attempts to develop different logic systems, closer in various respects to 
Natural Language. Strawson’s (1950; 1952) and Sommers’ (1982) are two such familiar earlier ones. 
 More recently, Lawrence Moss has published a series of works, some co-authored with Pratt-
Hartmann, which engage in the similar project of Natural Logic (Pratt-Hartmann and Moss 2009; 
Moss 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2011; 2015). Natural Logic has several aims. One main aim is to 
‘construct a system [whose] syntax is closer to that of a natural language than is first-order logic’ and 
give ‘logical systems in which one can carry out as much simple reasoning in language as possible’ 
(Moss 2010a, 538–539). Moss’s works ‘attempt to make a comprehensive study of the entailment 
relation in fragments of language’, ‘to go beyond truth conditions and examples, important as they 
are, and to aim for more global characterizations’ (Moss 2015, 561). ‘The subject of natural logic’, 
Moss writes, ‘might be defined as “logic for natural language, logic in natural language.” By this, we 
aim’, he clarifies, ‘to find logical systems that deal with inference in natural language, or something 
close to it.’ (Moss 2015, 563) Moss has tried to faithfully represent in his systems standard 
quantifiers, passive–active voice relations, comparative adjectives, and more. 
 A different system with similar aspirations which has also been recently developed is the 
Quantified Argument Calculus, or Quarc. Quarc is a powerful formal logic system, first introduced in 
Ben-Yami’s ‘The Quantified Argument Calculus’ (2014), based on work published by Ben-Yami in the 
preceding decade (primarily (Ben-Yami 2004)) and closely related to the calculus introduced in 
(Lanzet and Ben-Yami 2004). It is closer in its syntax than is the Predicate Calculus to Natural 
Language, sheds light on the logical role of some of the latter’s features which it incorporates (such 
as copular structure, converse relation terms and anaphora), and it is also closer to Natural Language 
in the logical relations it validates. (Ben-Yami 2014) contains a Lemmon-style natural deduction 
system for Quarc and a truth-valuational, substitutional semantics; this system has been shown to 
be sound and complete (Ben-Yami 2014; Ben-Yami and Pavlovic unpublished). Quarc has since been 
extended into a sound and complete three-valued system with defining clauses, using model-
theoretic semantics (Lanzet 2017). In this latter version it was shown to contain a semantically 
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isomorphic image of the Predicate Calculus. Thus, Quarc has been shown to be at least as strong as 
the first-order Predicate Calculus, and moreover, the proofs in these papers shed light on the nature 
of quantification in the Predicate Calculus (see there for details). In other works (Pavlovic 2017; 
Pavlović and Gratzl 2019), a sequent calculus has been developed for several versions of Quarc and 
various properties of the system, such as cut-elimination, subformula property and consistency were 
proved. Quarc has also been used to investigate Aristotelian logic, both assertoric and modal, in 
works mentioned above as well as in (Raab 2018). Raab concludes that the Quarc-reconstruction he 
provides of Aristotle’s logic is “much closer to Aristotle’s original text than other such 
reconstructions brought forward up to now” (abstract). 
 It would be interesting to compare what Natural Logic has achieved with what has or can be 
achieved by Quarc. The present paper embarks on this inquiry. 
 Only embarks, for limitations of space and time force us to leave out a comparative study of 
some central questions of the Natural Logic project. An important issue for Moss is that of 
decidability. He would like to determine whether the logic systems he constructs to incorporate 
reasoning in Natural Language, systems which are more limited in their expressive power than the 
first-order Predicate Calculus, are decidable. Moss and Pratt-Hartmann write: 
From a computational point of view … expressive power is a double-edged sword: roughly 
speaking, the more expressive a language is, the harder it is to compute with. In the last 
decade, this trade-off has led to renewed interest in inexpressive logics, in which the 
problem of determining entailments is algorithmically decidable with (in ideal cases) low 
complexity. The logical fragments subjected to this sort of complexity-theoretic analysis 
have naturally enough tended to be those which owe their salience to the syntax of first-
order logic, for example: the two-variable fragment, the guarded fragment, and various 
quantifier-prefix fragments. But of course it is equally reasonable to consider instead logics 
defined in terms of the syntax of natural languages. (2009, 647–48) 
Moss also thinks that decidable systems with less expressive power might represent more faithfully 
actual human reasoning (Moss 2015, 563). – Interesting and important as decidability questions are, 
they will not be addressed in this paper but be left for future work. 
 The primary concern of this paper is Quarc’s capacity to incorporate the Natural Language 
inferences studied by Natural Logic. Natural Logic’s starting point are a variety of inferences in 
Natural Language, all apparently formally valid. Formal systems are then built to incorporate some 
of these inferences. I shall examine whether Quarc can incorporate these inferences or how it 
should be extended to accomplish that. I shall also discuss the soundness and completeness of the 
systems I consider. 
 Quarc is introduced in the next section; I develop it there only to the extent needed for its 
application later in the paper. In the section following it, I first present several arguments which 
Moss considers, and then address each of them in a separate subsection. Along the way I also 
consider whether, with Moss, we should allow nouns to be negated. I end with a short conclusion, 
which also includes directions for future work. 
Introduction to Quarc 
By now, Quarc has been presented in several works and in several versions (Ben-Yami 2014; Lanzet 
2017; Pavlović and Gratzl 2019; Ben-Yami and Pavlovic unpublished) and there is therefore no need 
for an additional detailed exposition. Moreover, for our purposes below we do not need to employ 
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the full version of Quarc that was introduced in (Ben-Yami 2014). Accordingly, although I shall first 
informally introduce the full Quarc language of that paper, the following formal introduction will be 
of a reduced version (but with the addition of identity), one which we shall then continue to use. 
Informal Introduction of the System 
Consider a simple subject–predicate or argument–predicate sentence: 
1. Alice is polite 
Its grammatical form can be represented by 
2. (Alice) is polite 
with the argument in parenthesis, followed by the copula and then the predicate. In the Predicate 
Calculus, we formalise this sentence by 
3. P(a) 
Quarc does not deviate from this formalisation, apart from a typographical change: the arguments, 
in Quarc, are written to the left of the predicate: 
4. (a)P 
Similarly, 
5. Alice loves Bob 
is formalised, in Quarc, as 
6. (a, b)L 
 Consider next the quantified sentence, 
7. Every Student is polite 
Its grammatical form can be represented by 
8. (Every student) is polite. 
Here, grammatically, the argument is the noun phrase ‘every student’. In it, the quantifier ‘every’ 
attaches to the one-place predicate ‘student’, and together they form a quantified argument. This is 
the way quantification is incorporated in Quarc: 
9. (S)P 
Namely, quantifiers are not sentential operators. Rather, they attach to one-place predicates to form 
quantified arguments. Some other examples: 
10. Some students are polite 
11. Every girl loves Bob 
12. Every girl loves some boy 
are formalised (respectively; likewise below) by, 
13. (S)P 
14. (G, b)L 
15. (G, B)L 
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 This basic departure in the treatment of quantification requires a few additional ones. One is the 
need to reintroduce the copular structure and, with it, modes of predication, as in Aristotelian logic. 
In Natural Language, we can negate sentence (1), ‘Alice is polite’, in two ways: 
16. It’s not the case that Alice is polite 
17. Alice isn’t polite 
The Predicate Calculus allows only the first mode of negation – the one rarer and somewhat artificial 
in Natural Language – namely, sentential negation. Quarc, however, also allows the negation symbol 
to be written between the argument or arguments and the predicate, signifying negative 
predication, by contrast to affirmative one. These two sentences are thus formalised, respectively, 
by 
18. ¬((a)P) 
19. (a)¬P 
Parentheses can be omitted without ambiguity in these formulas, and they can be written as ¬aP 
and a¬P. Since the argument is singular, these two formulas are equivalent, and they shall be 
defined as such both in the proof system and in the semantics below. However, the equivalence 
does not hold when the argument is quantified: 
20. It’s not the case that some students are polite 
21. Some students aren’t polite 
formalised by: 
22. ¬(SP) 
23. (S)¬P 
These formulas will not be equivalent either in the proof system or in the semantics. 
 Some adjectives have a corresponding negative form: polite and impolite, for instance. Yet even 
if ‘Alice isn’t polite’ means the same as ‘Alice is impolite’, this is not the case with all such pairs of 
adjectives. Often, the negative form designates not the contradictory but the contrary of the positive 
one: while ‘reverent’ means, feeling or showing deep and solemn respect, ‘irreverent’ means, 
showing a lack of respect for people or things that are generally taken seriously (Oxford definitions); 
one’s attitude towards, say, religion can be neither reverent nor irreverent. Moreover, many 
adjectives have no negative form: tall, asleep, red; and relation words usually don’t – e.g., ‘loves’ or 
‘teacher of’. For these and other reasons (see below on negative nouns), the work done by negative 
predication cannot generally be accomplished by negative predicates.  
 All Natural Languages have the means of reordering the noun-phrases in relational sentences 
without changing, if the arguments are all singular, what is said by the sentences. Different 
languages achieve this by different means. English often accomplishes it by changing from active- to 
passive-voice: 
24. Alice loves Bob 
25. Bob is loved by Alice 
In the singular case, the two are logically equivalent. But again, this is not generally the case when 
the arguments are quantified: 
26. Every girl loves some boy 
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27. Some boy is loved by every girl 
Quarc incorporates this reordering by having an n-place predicate written with a permutation of the 
1, 2, … n sequence as superscripts to its right. Sentences (24) to (27) are then formalised by, 
28. (a, b)L 
29. (b, a)L2,1 
30. (G, B)L 
31. (B, G)L2,1 
As with negation, the formulas with singular arguments alone are defined as equivalent in both 
proof system and semantics, while this equivalence will not generally hold for sentences with 
quantified arguments. 
 The last additional feature of Quarc is its use of anaphora. Consider the two sentences, 
32. John loves John 
33. John loves himself 
The former is rarely used, although one of its uses is to explain the use of the reflexive pronoun 
‘himself’ in the latter. The reflexive pronoun ‘himself’ in (33) is anaphoric on the earlier occurrence 
of ‘John’, its source, in the sense that it can be replaced by its source and the sentence will have the 
same meaning. This eliminable anaphor is what Geach called, pronoun of laziness (1962, sec. 76). 
Quarc incorporates it by using a Greek letter for the anaphor, also written as a subscript to the right 
of its source. Accordingly, it formalises (32) and (33) by: 
34. (j, j)L 
35. (jα, α)L 
The formalisation of quantified sentences in which quantified arguments have anaphors is similar: 
36. Every man loves himself 
37. (Mα, α)L 
As with negation and reordering, if all arguments are singular, then a Quarc formula with an anaphor 
and the formula with that anaphor replaced by its source are defined as equivalent in both proof 
system and semantics. However, the anaphor is no longer generally replaceable by its source when 
the latter is quantified, neither in Natural Language nor in Quarc. 
 With this I conclude the informal introduction of Quarc and turn to the more rigorous 
introduction of the formal system. However, for the purposes of the discussion below, we don’t 
need to use formulas with anaphora. I therefore introduce a reduced version of Quarc, in this 
respect, which will make it easier to follow and focus on the main argument of this paper. The 
interested reader is referred to the works mentioned above to see how anaphora is incorporated in 
the full version of Quarc. 
Vocabulary of Quarc 
The language of Quarc contains the following symbols: 
38. (Vocabulary) 
• Predicates: P, Q, R, …, denumerably many and each with a fixed number of places, including 
the two-place predicate =. 
• Singular arguments (SAs): a, b, c, …, denumerably many. 
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• Sentential operators: ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔. 
• Quantifiers: , . 
• Numerals used as indices, comma, parentheses. 
If P is a one-place predicate, then P and P will be called quantified arguments (QAs). An argument 
is a singular argument or a quantified one. For every n-place predicate R, n > 1, apart from =, Rπ, 
where π is any permutation of 1, …, n (including the identity permutation), is called a reordered form 
of R; Rπ is also an n-place predicate. 
Formulas of Quarc 
The following rules specify all the ways in which formulas can be generated. 
39. (Formulas) 
39.1. (Basic formula) If P is a non-reordered n-place predicate and c1, …, cn singular arguments 
(SAs), then (c1, …, cn)P is a formula, called a basic formula. 
39.2. (Reorder) If P is a reordered n-place predicate, n > 1, and c1, …, cn SAs, then (c1, …, cn)P is 
a formula. 
39.3. (Negative predication) If P is an n-place predicate and c1, …, cn SAs, then (c1, …, cn)¬P is a 
formula. 
39.4. (Identity) If c1 and c2 are SAs then c1 = c2 is a formula. c1 = c2 is an alternative way of 
writing (c1, c2)=. 
39.5. (Sentential operators) If φ and ψ are formulas, so are ¬(φ), (φ)∧(ψ), (φ)∨(ψ), (φ)→(ψ) 
and (φ)↔(ψ). The parentheses surrounding formulas are called sentential parentheses. 
39.6. (Quantification) If φ is a formula containing an occurrence of an SA c, and substituting 
the quantified argument qP (i.e., P or P) for c will result in qP governing φ (see 
definition below), then φ[qP/c] is a formula. (φ[qP/c] is the formula in which qP replaced 
the occurrence of c.) 
Formulas of the form, (c1, …, cn)P, in which P is a reordered predicate are not considered basic 
formulas, as this simplifies the semantic definitions below. 
Governance 
The notion of governance, which is related to that of scope in the Predicate Calculus, is defined as 
follows: 
40. (Governance) An occurrence qP of a QA governs a string of symbols A just in case qP is the 
leftmost QA in A and A does not contain any other string of symbols (B), in which the displayed 
parentheses are a pair of sentential parentheses, such that B contains qP. 
Once anaphors are introduced, the notion of governance becomes non-trivial and its definition 
needs elaboration. Since they are not introduced in this formal part, determining whether a 
quantified argument governs a formula is straightforward. For instance, S governs the formulas 
(S)P, (S)¬P, (a, S)L, (S, P)L and (S, P)L1,2 – the last two because it is to the left of P. By 
contrast, S does not govern ¬((S)P), since it is contained in ((S)P); nor ((S)P)∧(aQ), as it is 
contained in ((S)P); nor (Q, S)L, since Q is to its left. For the reduced Quarc language of this 
paper, a somewhat simpler definition of governance could be provided, practically listing the 
schemas of formulas governed by a QA; I prefer to use this definition in order to facilitate the 
transition to fuller Quarc languages. 
 We shall often omit parentheses where no ambiguity arises. 
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Truth-valuational, substitutional semantics 
As in (Ben-Yami 2014), I use here a truth-valuational, substitutional semantics for Quarc. Justification 
of the approach and answers to some common or possible objections, neither specific to Quarc but 
as a general semantic approach, can be found in (Ben-Yami 2014) and (Ben-Yami and Pavlovic 
unpublished). The results below do not depend on the use of this semantics: a model-theoretic 
semantics for Quarc can and has been developed. A precursor of Quarc with model-theoretic 
semantics is found in (Lanzet and Ben-Yami 2004) and a three-valued version of Quarc with model-
theoretic semantics is found in (Lanzet 2017). 
41. (Truth-Value Assignments) The following holds for any truth-value assignment, or valuation: 
41.1. (Basic formula) Every basic formula is assigned the truth-value of true or false, but not 
both. 
41.2. (Reorder) Let P be a non-reordered n-place predicate, n > 1, and π = π1,…,πn a 
permutation of 1,2,…,n. Then, the truth-value assigned to (cπ1, …, cπn)Pπ is that assigned 
to (c1, …, cn)P. 
41.3. (Law of Identity) Every formula of the form c = c is true. 
41.4. (Indiscernibility of Identicals) If t = c is true and the formula φ[t1,…,tn] is a basic formula 
containing the instances t1,…,tn of an SA t, then φ[c/t1,…,c/tn] is true if φ[t1,…,tn] is true. 
41.5. (Instantiation) For every one-place predicate P there is some SA c such that (c)P is true. 
41.6. (Sentential operators) Let φ and ψ be formulas. Then, ¬(φ) is true just in case φ is false, 
etc. 
41.7. (Negative predication) Let P be an n-place predicate and c1, …, cn SAs. The truth-value of 
(c1, …, cn)¬P is that of ¬(c1, …, cn)P. 
41.8. (Quantification) Let φ[P] (φ[P]) be a formula governed by an occurrence of P (P). If 
for every (some) SA c for which (c)P is true, φ[c/P] is true, then φ[P] (φ[P]) is true. If 
for some (every) c for which (c)P is true φ[c/P] is false, then φ[P] (φ[P]) is false. 
 
42. (Validity) An argument whose premises are all and only the formulas in the set of formulas 𝔖 
and whose conclusion is the formula φ is valid, written 𝔖 ⊨ φ, just in case every valuation that 
makes all the formulas in 𝔖 true also makes φ true, even if we add or eliminate singular 
arguments from our language (of course, only singular arguments not occurring in 𝔖 or φ can be 
eliminated). We also say that 𝔖 entails φ. 
For a discussion of these definitions, see (Ben-Yami 2014). 
Proof System 
The proof system used here is based on that found in (Ben-Yami 2014; Ben-Yami and Pavlovic 
unpublished), with the omission of the rules for anaphora. I use a Lemmon-style natural deduction 
system, based on the one introduced in (Jaśkowski 1934) and further developed and streamlined in 
(Fitch 1952), (Lemmon 1978) and elsewhere. Proofs are written as follows: 
43. (Proof) A proof is a sequence of lines of the form <L, (i), φ, R>, where L is a possibly empty list of 
line numbers; (i) the line number in parenthesis; φ a formula; and R the justification, a name of a 
derivation rule possibly followed by line numbers, written according to one of the derivation 
rules specified below. φ is said to depend on the formulas listed in L. The line numbers in L are 
written without repetitions and in ascending order. The formula in the last line of the proof is its 
conclusion. If there is a proof with the formula φ as conclusion, depending only of formulas from 
the set 𝔖, then φ is provable from 𝔖, or 𝔖 ⊢ φ. 
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I next list the derivation rules of the system. 
44. (Derivation rules) 
44.1. (Premise) As any line of a proof, any formula can be written, depending on itself, its 
justification being Premise: 
i (i) φ Premise 
44.2. (Propositional Calculus Rules, PCR) We allow the usual derivation rules of the 
Propositional Calculus. 
44.3. (Identity Introduction, =I) As any line of the proof a formula of the form c = c can be 
written, depending on no premises, with its justification being =I. 
 (i) c = c =I 
44.4. (Identity Elimination, =E) (This and the following rules specify how to add a line to a 
proof which contains preceding lines of the specified forms.) Let φ be a basic formula 
containing occurrences t1, …, tn of the singular argument t (φ may also contain additional 
occurrences of t). 
L1 (i) φ  
L2 (j) t = c  
L1, L2 (k) φ[c/t1, …, c/tn] =E i, j 
Where L1, L2 is the list of numbers occurring either in L1 or in L2. 
44.5. (Sentence negation to Predication negation, SP) Let P be an n-place predicate and 
c1, …, cn singular arguments. 
L (i) ¬(c1, …, cn)P  
L (j) (c1, …, cn)¬P SP i 
44.6. (Predication negation to Sentence negation, PS) Let P be an n-place predicate and 
c1, …, cn singular arguments. 
L (i) (c1, …, cn)¬P  
L (j) ¬(c1, …, cn)P PS i 
44.7. (Reorder, R) Let P be an n-place predicate, n > 1, and π = π1,…,πn and ρ = ρ1,…,ρn two 
permutations of 1,2,…,n (the identity permutation included). 
L (i) (cπ1, …, cπn)Pπ  
L (j) (cρ1, …, cρn)Pρ R i 
44.8. (Universal Introduction, I) Let φ[P] be a formula governed by P. Assume that 
neither φ[P] nor the formulas in lines L apart from (c)P in line i contain any occurrence 
of the singular argument c. 
i (i) (c)P Premise 
L (j) φ[c/P]  
L – i (k) φ[P] I i, j 
Where L – i is the possibly empty list of numbers occurring in L apart from i. 
44.9. (Universal Elimination, E) Let φ[P] be a formula governed by P. 
L1 (i) φ[P]  
L2 (j) (c)P  
L1, L2 (k) φ[c/P] E i, j 
44.10. (Particular1 Introduction, I) Let φ[P] be a formula governed by P. 
L1 (i) φ[c/P]  
L2 (j) (c)P  
L1, L2 (k) φ[P] I i, j 
 
1 Why the quantifier is called, in Quarc, particular and not existential is explained in (Ben-Yami 2004, sec. 6.5; 
2014, 123; 2020, sec. 5). 
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44.11. (Instantial Import, Ins)2 Let q stand for either  or , and φ[qP] be governed by qP. 
Assume c does not occur in φ[qP], ψ or any of the formulas L1, and in no formula L2 apart 
from j and k. 
L1 (i) φ[qP]  
j (j) (c)P Premise 
k (k) φ[c/qP] Premise 
L2 (l) Ψ  
L1, L2 – j – k (m) Ψ Ins i, j, k, l 
 
 As examples, I provide three proofs, which between them demonstrate all the derivation rules 
apart from the rules for identity, which are not special to Quarc, and Reorder, which is used later. 
First, (S)P ⊢ (∃P)S: 
1 (1) (S)P Premise 
2 (2) aS Premise 
3 (3) aP Premise 
2, 3 (4) (P)S I 2, 3 
1 (5) (P)S Ins 1, 2, 3, 4 
This inference, being part of the Aristotelian Square or Opposition, is invalid on the standard 
translation of these sentences to the Predicate Calculus. Quarc is closer in this respect to Aristotelian 
Logic; for discussion, see (Ben-Yami 2004; 2014; Lanzet 2017; Raab 2018). 
Secondly, the Aristotelian Barbara, i.e., (S)M, (M)P ⊢ (S)P: 
1 (1) (S)M Premise 
2 (2) (M)P Premise 
3 (3) aS Premise 
1, 3 (4) aM E 1, 3 
1, 2, 3 (5) aP E 2, 4 
1, 2 (6) (S)P I 3, 5 
And lastly, another Aristotelian conversion: ‘No P is S’ follows from ‘No S is P’. Instead of 
introducing into Quarc a negative quantifier translating ‘no’ – something that can be done – these 
sentences are translated here as synonymous with ‘Every/any S is not P’ or (S)¬P, and (P)¬S, and 
we show that (S)¬P ⊢ (P)¬S: 
1 (1) (S)¬P Premise 
2 (2) aP Premise 
3 (3) aS Premise 
1, 3 (4) a¬P E 1, 3 
1, 3 (5) ¬aP PS 4 
1, 2 (6) ¬aS PCR (¬I) 3, 2, 5 
1, 2 (7) a¬S SP 6 
1 (8) (P)¬S I 2, 7 
 
2 In (Ben-Yami 2014, 133) this rule was called Instantiation. ‘Instantial Import’, however, is preferable for 
several reasons. First, in this way the ambiguity of ‘Instantiation’ is avoided, as it is used only for the truth-
value assignment rule in Definition 41.5. Secondly, unlike ‘Instantiation’, the phrase ‘Instantial Import’ does 
not imply that this derivation rule presupposes that any one-place predicate has instances. What it does 
presuppose is that for a formula as in (i) to be true, P should have instances; and this is the case even if we 
allow some one-place predicates to be empty and adopt a three-valued system as in (Lanzet 2017). Lastly, 
‘Instantial Import’ hints at a relation of this rule to the Predicate Calculus’ existential import. 
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For additional examples, see (Ben-Yami 2014; Ben-Yami and Pavlovic unpublished). 
Incorporation in Quarc of the inferences motivating the Natural Logic 
project 
The inferences to be considered 
In different works, Moss provides different examples of the kinds of inference he discusses in the 
context of his Natural Logic project. I shall use here, as our point of departure, the inferences he lists 
in his ‘Natural Logic’ (Moss 2015, 561–562). This list is more detailed and more recent than those 
found elsewhere in his writings.3 
1. Passive voice 
Some dog sees some cat 
Some cat is seen by some dog 
2. Conjunctive predicates 
Bao is seen and heard by every student 
Amina is a student 
Amina sees Bao 
3. Comparative adjectives 
Every giraffe is taller than every gnu 
Some gnu is taller than every lion 
Some lion is taller than some zebra 
Every giraffe is taller than some zebra 
4. Defining clauses 
All skunks are mammals 
All who fear all who respect all skunks fear all who respect all mammals 
5. Comparative quantifiers 
More students than professors run 
More professors than deans run 
More students than deans run 
I shall examine the incorporation of inferences of these kinds in Quarc, each in a separate 
subsection. But before turning to them, I address a different feature which some of Moss’s systems 
contain, negative nouns. 
 
3 A reviewer drew my attention to two other relevant works by Moss, (Moss 2016) and (Moss and Topal 2018) 
(the latter published, online only, shortly before this paper was submitted), in which additional inferences 
involving comparative quantifiers are involved. I comment on them when discussing comparative quantifiers 
below. 
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Negative nouns 
Some of Moss’s formal systems contain devices intended to represent ‘negated nouns such as “non-
man” or “non-animal”’ (Pratt-Hartmann and Moss 2009, 648). Moss thinks that ‘this is rather 
unnatural in standard speech but it would be exemplified in sentences like Every non-dog runs’ 
(Moss 2015, 567–68). Other examples Moss provides there are All non-apples on the table are blue 
and Bernadette knew all non-students at the party (564). 
 But when such sentences are used, which I suspect is rarely, they are surely used as elliptical for 
sentences like, ‘All fruits on the table which aren’t apples are blue’ or ‘Bernadette knew all non-
student guests at the party’. There were also breadcrumbs on the table, but we didn’t mean to say 
that they were blue; and there were also drinks and finger food at the party. 
 This ellipsis understanding is also shared by Moss. In his (2010a, 539–40), we find an 
introductory dialogue between A, Moss’s mouthpiece, and a Questioning Q. Q requests ‘an example 
of some non-trivial inference carried out in natural language’, to which A responds by mentioning an 
inference containing the premise, Every non-pineapple is bigger than every unripe fruit. Q 
immediately remonstrates: ‘“non-pineapple”?! I thought this was supposed to be natural language’; 
and A excuses himself with, ‘Take it as a shorthand for “piece of fruit which is not a pineapple”’. 
Regrettably, Q acquiesces: ‘Ok, I get it.’ 
 Yet if, instead of Q, A would have encountered Critical C, she might have retorted, ‘So why not 
stay with “fruits which aren’t pineapples”? Should Logic turn a shorthand into a formal syntactic 
feature?! And you anyway intend to incorporate defining clauses in your system, for instance when 
formalising “all who respect all skunks”, so you shall have the resources for “fruits which aren’t 
pineapples”. If your goal is, as you stated, “logic for natural language, logic in natural language”, then 
try avoiding non-men, non-dogs and other non-natural creatures’. 
 C’s point is supported by an observation due to Aristotle. In his Categories (~BC330), when 
discussing primary, individual substances – an individual man or horse, for instance – and secondary 
substances, like ‘man’ and ‘animal’ as species and genera, he notes: 
Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the contrary of any 
primary substance, such as the individual man or animal? It has none. Nor can the species or 
the genus have a contrary. (Categories 5, 3b24) 
Since there is no contrary to man or animal, ‘non-man’ and ‘non-animal’ cannot function, on their 
own, as noun phrases. 
 The actual Natural Language sentences which Moss formalises by means of formal negative 
nouns, designated by a bar (q̅ for non-q’s), are sentences like, ‘Some p aren’t q’ and ‘Some p don’t r 
any q’, formalised by (p, q̅) and (p, (q, r)̅) (Moss 2015, 573). (We don’t need to go into the details 
of Moss’s syntax, since for our purposes the idea is sufficiently clear from these examples.) These 
two sentences are formalised in Quarc by (P)¬Q and (P, Q)¬R. Accordingly, Quarc can formalise 
these sentences without recourse to negative nouns but by using negation as a mode of predication, 
as it is indeed used in Natural Language. 
 I think that finding the idea of negative nouns acceptable is influenced by the semantic idea of a 
domain of discourse. If, when quantifying, the plurality over which we quantify is that of a domain of 
discourse, then we can single out a part of it either as containing all items to which a predicate p 
applies, or all those to which it does not apply. Indeed, when Moss develops a semantics for 
languages that include negative nouns, his model or structure 𝔄 contains a non-empty set A which 
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functions as the domain, and if p𝔄 ⊆ A, then p̅𝔄 = A \ p𝔄 (Pratt-Hartmann and Moss 2009, 651). 
However, a domain of discourse, in the technical sense in which the idea is employed in semantics, is 
an artefact of Fregean Logic, whose quantified sentences contain no expression specifying the 
plurality over which they quantify. For this reason, the semantics must introduce an otherwise 
implicit domain. Natural Language sentences, by contrast, do specify the plurality over which they 
quantify: when I say, ‘All your students came to class’, I specify your students as the relevant 
plurality. Quarc follows Natural Language in this respect, and needs no domain of discourse or of 
quantification (Ben-Yami 2004, 59–60; Lanzet 2017). Once the domain is eliminated, ‘non-man’ and 
‘non-animal’ have nothing to designate and should be eliminated as well. 
 For these reasons, I think that negative nouns are not needed and should not be included in a 
logic which aspires to be a logic for Natural Language. As argued above, the rare sentences which 
apparently use them are better seen as elliptical: as such they can be formalised in Quarc, which 
therefore does not need to contain negative nouns. 
Passive Voice 
45. Some dog sees some cat 
Some cat is seen by some dog 
 Quarc was developed to incorporate reordering devices such as the active–passive voice 
distinction. If ‘a sees b’ is formalised, ‘(a, b)S’, then ‘b is seen by a’ is formalised, ‘(b, a)S2,1’. We show 
that, 
46. (D, C)S ⊢ (C, D)S2,1 
Proof: 
1 (1) (D, C)S Premise 
2 (2) aD Premise 
3 (3) (a, C)S Premise 
4 (4) bC Premise 
5 (5) (a, b)S Premise 
5 (6) (b, a)S2,1 R 5 
2, 5 (7) (b, D)S2,1 I 2, 6 
2, 4, 5 (8) (C, D)S2,1 I 4, 7 
2, 3 (9) (C, D)S2,1 Ins 3, 4, 5, 8 
1 (10) (C, D)S2,1 Ins 1, 2, 3, 9 
 Quarc with truth-valuational semantics has been shown to be sound and complete in (Ben-Yami 
2014) and (Ben-Yami and Pavlovic unpublished); a model-theoretic version of this results is found, 
for an earlier version of the system and for a three-valued version of it, in (Lanzet and Ben-Yami 
2004) and (Lanzet 2017). Accordingly, Quarc is a sound and complete formal system, with a syntax 
modelled on Natural Language’s, which incorporates inferences like (45). 
Conjunctive predicates 
47. Bao is seen and heard by every student 
Amina is a student 
Amina sees Bao 
The new element in this inference is the conjunctive verb, or more generally conjunctive predicate, 
‘see and hear’. We shall extend Quarc to incorporate it. 
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 We take our cue for the incorporation of conjunctive predicates in Quarc from the way negative 
predication, reordering and anaphora were incorporated in it. Namely, we shall define valuation- 
and derivation rules for the case in which all arguments are singular terms, and show that these 
together with the other rules which have already been defined provide us with desirable results for 
the more complex cases as well. 
Vocabulary 
We do not extend the basic vocabulary of Quarc but define, 
48. (Conjunctive predicates) If P and Q are n-place predicates, so is (P)∧(Q), which is called a 
conjunctive predicate. 
Conjunction of predicates can be iterated. Assuming P, Q and R and n-place predicates, so are 
((P)∧(Q))∧(R), (P)∧((Q))∧(R)), ((P)∧(Q))∧((R)∧(P)), and so on. However, as can be proved, formulas 
with the same predicates ordered and grouped in whichever way, with or without repetition, are 
equivalent both semantically and proof-theoretically. This allows us to omit parentheses for some 
conjunctive predicates: both ((P)∧(Q))∧(R) and (P)∧((Q))∧(R)) can be written as P∧Q∧R. 
 Notice that many-place conjunctive predicates can be reordered like any other many-place 
predicate. 
Formulas 
No new rules. If P and Q are one-place predicates, then (a)(P)∧(Q) is a formula. Similarly for any 
n-place predicates and any arguments. 
Semantics 
49. (Conjunctive Predication). Let P and Q be n-place predicates, and c1, …, cn singular arguments. 
The truth-value assigned to (c1, …, cn)(P)∧(Q) on a valuation is that assigned to (c1, …, cn)P∧(c1, …, 
cn)Q. 
Examples. If, on a given valuation, aP, aQ and aR are true, then so are, according to our definition, 
a(P)∧(Q), a(Q)∧(R) and a(R)∧(P). Accordingly, so are a((P)∧(Q))∧(R), a(P)∧((Q)∧(R)) and 
a((P)∧(Q))∧((R)∧(P)). If aP is false, then so are a(P)∧(Q), a(P)∧((Q)∧(R)) and a(R)∧(P); and so on. 
 This rule yields the desirable results for the two different sentences, 
50. Every linguist knows and admires some philosopher. 
formalised as, 
51. (L, P)(K)∧(A) 
and 
52. Every linguist knows some philosopher and every linguist admires some philosopher 
Formalised as, 
53. (L, P)K ∧ (L, P)A 
According to Universal Quantification, (51) is true on a valuation just in case so are all formulas of 
the form, (l, P)(K)∧(A), where for l the formula lL is true. The formula (l, P)(K)∧(A) is true, according 
to Particular Quantification, just in case so is some formula of the form, (l, p)(K)∧(A), where for p the 
formula pP is true. Next, according to Conjunctive Predication, (l, p)(K)∧(A) is true just in case so is 
(l, p)K ∧ (l, p)A. Namely, (51) is true iff every linguist knows some philosopher and admires the same 
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philosopher. By contrast, since (53) is true just in case so is each of its conjuncts, we shall not get 
that every linguist need admire a philosopher he knows. 
Proofs 
We add an introduction and an elimination rules for conjunctive predicates: 
54. (Conjunctive Predication Introduction, CP-I) Let P and Q be n-place predicates, c1, …, cn singular 
arguments. 
L (i) (c1, …, cn)P ∧ (c1, …, cn)Q 
L (j) (c1, …, cn)(P)∧(Q)  CP-I i 
55. (Conjunctive Predication Elimination, CP-E) Let P and Q be n-place predicates, c1, …, cn singular 
arguments. 
L (i) (c1, …, cn)(P)∧(Q) 
L (j) (c1, …, cn)P ∧ (c1, …, cn)Q CP-E i 
It is straightforward to see that soundness is preserved. 
 The completeness of Quarc on the truth-valuational approach is proved in (Ben-Yami and 
Pavlovic unpublished) by adapting Henkin’s proof (Henkin 1949). We won’t provide here the 
complete proof but only specify its features that are relevant for proving that the completeness of 
the system is preserved with the additional structures introduced in this paper. As part of the proof, 
a ‘Henkin Theory’ is specified, consisting of all formulas falling under certain schemas. It is then 
shown that any valuation that respects the truth-value assignment rules for the connectives of the 
propositional calculus while making all the formulas of the Henkin Theory true, respects all the truth-
value assignment rules of Quarc as well. Later, some of the formulas of the Henkin Theory are shown 
to be theorems of Quarc. 
 To prove that completeness is preserved, we should add to the Henkin theory the axiom 
schema, 
56. (c1, …, cn)(P)∧(Q) ↔ ((c1, …, cn)P ∧ (c1, …, cn)Q) 
Any valuation that respects the truth-value assignment rule for the connective ↔ while making all 
the formulas of this form true, clearly respects Conjunctive Predication (49) as well. And, given CP-I 
and CP-E, this is a schema of theorems of Quarc. See (Henkin 1949) and (Ben-Yami and Pavlovic 
unpublished) for further details. 
 We can now turn to a proof of the argument opening this subsection. We formalise it as follows: 
Bao is seen and heard by every student: (b, S)(C∧H)2,1 
Amina is a student: aS 
Amina sees Bao: (a, b)C 
We show that, 
57. (b, S)(C∧H)2,1 , aS ⊢ (a, b)C 
Proof: 
1 (1) (b, S)(C∧H)2,1 Premise 
2 (2) aS Premise 
1, 2 (3) (b, a)(C∧H)2,1 E 1, 2 
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1, 2 (4) (a, b)C∧H  R 3 
1, 2 (5) (a, b)C ∧ (a, b)H CP-E 4 
1, 2 (6) (a, b)C PCR (∧E) 5 
Comparative adjectives 
58. Every giraffe is taller than every gnu 
Some gnu is taller than every lion 
Some lion is taller than some zebra 
Every giraffe is taller than some zebra 
 Most comparative adjectives are transitive: if Alice is younger than Bob, and Bob younger than 
Charlie, then Alice is younger than Charlie. It might thus seem that this transitivity is built into 
language as a formal rule, for any comparative adjective of the form, φ-er. There are, however, 
exceptions, as we learn from Rock–Paper–Scissors: in this game, paper is stronger or better than 
rock, rock is stronger than scissors, yet scissors is stronger than paper. 
 Such exceptions notwithstanding, we shall treat in this subsection comparative adjectives of the 
form φ-er as transitive. I do not think that the transitivity of adjectives of the φ-er structure is merely 
a frequent albeit contingent fact. Rather, we have here a rule of grammar which allows exceptions. 
That the past tense of ‘go’ is ‘went’ does not show it not to be a rule that the past tense of verbs is 
formed by adding ‘ed’. With comparative adjectives we have a different kind of rule and exception, 
concerning not syntax but meaning; yet this does not affect the fact that transitivity is a rule for the 
use of comparative adjectives, to be overridden only if the exception is explicitly introduced. 
Vocabulary and formulas 
We add to the language denumerably many two-place comparative predicates, Per, Qer, Rer… No new 
formula rules. 
Semantics 
59. (Comparative Adjective Transitivity). Let Per be a comparative predicate, and c1, c2 and c3 
singular arguments. If the truth-value assigned to (c1, c2)Per and (c2, c3)Per on a valuation is true, 
then that assigned to (c1, c3)P is also true. 
Proofs 
60. (Comparative Adjective Transitivity, CAT) Let Per be a comparative predicate, c1, c2 and c3 
singular arguments. 
L1 (i) (c1, c2)Per  
L2 (j) (c2, c3)Per  
L1, L2 (k) (c1, c3)Per CAT i, j 
Soundness is again immediate. Completeness is proved by adding to the Henkin theory all the 
formulas which fall under the schema, 
61. (c1, c2)Per ∧ (c2, c3)Per → (c1, c3)Per 
Any valuation that respects the truth-value assignment rules for the connectives ∧ and → while 
making all the formulas of this form true, respects (59) as well. All formulas of this form are 
theorems of Quarc, provable from CAT. See again (Ben-Yami and Pavlovic unpublished) for further 
details. 
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 The proof of (58) is quite tedious and adds no interesting element to what we learn from proofs 
of simpler inferences. I shall therefore formalise and prove instead the following: 
62. Every giraffe is taller than every wildebeest, (G, W)Ter 
Some wildebeest is taller than every lion, (W, L)Ter 
Every giraffe is taller than every lion: (G, L)Ter 
We show that: 
63. (G, W)Ter, (W, L)Ter ⊢ (G, L)Ter 
Proof: 
1 (1) (G, W)Ter Premise 
2 (2) (W, L)Ter Premise 
3 (3) gG Premise 
1, 3 (4) (g, W)Ter E 1, 3 
5 (5) wW Premise 
1, 3, 5 (6) (g, w)Ter E 4, 5 
7 (7) (w, L)Ter Premise 
8 (8) lL Premise 
7, 8 (9) (w, l)Ter E 7, 8 
1, 3, 5, 7, 8 (10) (g, l)Ter CAT 6, 9 
1, 3, 5, 7 (11) (g, L)Ter I 8, 10 
1, 5, 7 (12) (G, L)Ter I 3, 11 
1, 2 (13) (G, L)Ter Ins 2, 5, 7, 12 
Asymmetry 
Another property of comparative adjectives is asymmetry. If Alice is younger than Bob, then Bob 
isn’t younger than Alice. Unlike transitivity, asymmetry seems to have no exception for comparative 
adjectives. 
 This property can also be straightforwardly incorporated in Quarc. Nothing needs to be added to 
either vocabulary of formula rules. In the semantics, the rule should be that if (c1, c2)Per is true on a 
valuation, then (c2, c1)Per is false on it. And the rule of inference should allow the inference, 
(c1, c2)Per ⊢ ¬(c2, c1)Per. We shall not develop this further here. 
Defining clauses 
64. All skunks are mammals 
All who fear all who respect all skunks fear all who respect all mammals 
Those who respect the skunks and mammals, as well as those who fear the former, are presumably 
not respectful triangles or fearful ideas, say. Which respectful and fearful ‘things’ are referred to 
would depend on context, but something more specific does seem to be meant. We shall assume 
here that the conclusion is about creatures generally, and consider it as elliptical for, 
65. All creatures who fear all creatures who respect all skunks fear all creatures who respect all 
mammals. 
This will enable us to treat inference (64) by means of the extended, three-valued Quarc system 
developed in (Lanzet 2017), which has the syntactic and semantic resources to represent defining 
clauses and can straightforwardly translate sentences such as (65). 
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 One might object and claim that the conclusion of (64) is about absolutely everything. Triangles 
and ideas, so might one continue, also fall within its purview, only they happen not to fear or respect 
anything, ipso facto skunks and mammals. – I find this approach unconvincing when applied to 
Natural Language, whose logic both Natural Logic and Quarc aim to represent. However, the issue 
need not be decided for the purpose of formalising inference (64) in Quarc: the means for 
representing absolute generality are provided in both (Lanzet and Ben-Yami 2004) and (Lanzet 
2017), in each somewhat differently, by the introduction of a special predicate, Thing or T. Very 
roughly, the idea is that everything is a Thing: for every constant c, cT is true. (This special predicate 
also helps explore the relations between Quarc and the Predicate Calculus.) – We shall not develop 
this idea further here, though, but continue with the assumption that a predicate with narrower 
application is assumed, and use creature as in (65). 
 The three-valued Quarc system of (Lanzet 2017) is too complex to be fully presented in this 
paper. I shall therefore introduce only some of its features, which will enable us to get an idea of 
how sentence (65) and consequently inference (64) are handled by it. The reader is referred to 
(Lanzet 2017) for a full exposition. Since we are not inquiring into decidability in this paper but 
leaving it as a subject for future work, neither shall we inquire whether a restricted, simpler yet 
complete and decidable version of that system suffices for the formalisation of the relevant 
arguments. 
Compound predicates 
Consider the sentence, 
66. Alice is a woman who knows Bob. 
It is logically equivalent to, 
67. Alice is a woman and Alice knows Bob. 
While (67) is formalised in Quarc as, 
68. aW ∧ (a, b)K 
we shall formalise (66) by, 
69. aWx:(x, b)K 
The chain of symbols, Wx:(x, b)K, is considered a compound predicate. 
 More generally, if φ[a] is a formula and P a one-place predicate, then Px:φ[x] is a compound 
predicate, which is also a one-place predicate. φ[a] contains no occurrence of x (to avoid ambiguity), 
and x replaced some or all occurrences of a in φ[a]. Px:φ[x] can be read, P which is φ. (b)Px:φ[x] is 
true on a valuation just in case bP and φ[b/x] are true on that valuation. 
 With this in place, we can formalise the following compound predicates: 
Creatures who respect Mumbo Cx:(x, m)R 
Creatures who respect all mammals Cx:(x, M)R 
Creatures who fear all creatures Cx:(x, C)F 
Creatures who fear all creatures who respect Mumbo Cx:(x, Cy:(y, m)R)F 
Creatures who fear all creatures who respect all mammals Cx:(x, Cy:(y, M)R)F 
And we can now formalise sentence (65) as well, ‘All creatures who fear all creatures who respect all 
skunks fear all creatures who respect all mammals’: 
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70. ( Cx:(x, Cy:(y, S)R)F,  Cy:(y, M)R ) F 
Proofs 
(Lanzet 2017) develops a three-valued system, allowing for some formulas to lack a truth value. ‘All 
my children work in the coal mines’ is neither true nor false when uttered by a childless person. 
Similarly, SP and SP will lack a truth value when S has no instances. If our conception of validity in 
a three-valued system is that truth entails truth, and this is Lanzet’s conception, then this three-
valued framework complicates the proof system. The classical Negation Introduction rule, for 
instance, cannot be employed. In addition, some of the rules for quantifiers should be modified, 
because in some cases we should guarantee that the predicate occurring in the argument position, 
say P, has instances. This can be done in several ways, one of them having (P)P among our 
premises: this formula is true if only if P has instances. For these two reasons, the -Introduction 
rule is replaced by two rules. Lanzet uses a proof system which operates on sequents, although 
resembling a natural deduction system in its inference rules. Adapting his rules to the system used in 
this paper, his I1 rule will be: 
i (i) cP Premise 
L1 (j) φ[c/P]  
L2 (k) PP  
L1 -i, L2 (l) φ[P] I1 i, j, k 
Where P governs φ[P] and c does not occur in L1 apart from i, in L2 or in φ[P]. 
 Returning to the inference with which we opened this subsection, on the conception of validity 
as truth entails truth, sentence (65), ‘All creatures who fear all creatures who respect all skunks fear 
all creatures who respect all mammals’, follows from ‘All skunks are mammals’ only if we assume 
that the compound predicates in the conclusion’s argument positions, ‘creatures who fear all 
creatures who respect all skunks’, and ‘creatures who respect all mammals’ have instances. 
Otherwise, if no one respected mammals, say, there would be no one to fear in the conclusion, and 
a true premise would have a conclusion which is neither true nor false. – We can develop a different 
conception of validity for three-valued systems, in which, instead of truth leading to truth, an 
argument is valid just in case, if its premises are not false, then its conclusion isn’t false either 
(Halldén 1949). Another option is to define validity for a three-valued system as, if the premises are 
true then the conclusion isn’t false (the tolerant conception of validity (Cobreros et al. 2013)). On 
either conception, a valid argument with true premises may have a conclusion which has no truth-
value, and no additional premise should be added to (64). Both options are worth exploring, but 
here we shall limit ourselves to the option Lanzet adopts and take validity to mean, truth entails 
truth. 
 We should, therefore, add to (64) the two premises, 
71. (Cx:(x, Cy:(y, S)R)F)Cx:(x, Cy:(y, S)R)F 
72. (Cy:(y, M)R)Cy:(y, M)R 
and show the following: 
73. SM  ,  (Cx:(x, Cy:(y, S)R)F)Cx:(x, Cy:(y, S)R)F  ,  (Cy:(y, M)R)Cy:(y, M)R 
⊢  (Cx:(x, Cy:(y, S)R)F, Cy:(y, M)R)F 
The proof is long and requires familiarity with the rules of (Lanzet 2017), so instead of providing it 
we shall show that the inference is valid. Since the system of that paper was proved there to be 
complete, it follows that the inference can be proved. 
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Proof: 
We should show that, if on a valuation 𝔙 the three premises of (73) are true, then for every 
instance a of Cx:(x, Cy:(y, S)R)F and every instance b of Cy:(y, M)R, the following is also 
true, (a, b)F. 
From premises (71) and (72), we know that each of these compound predicates has 
instances. So suppose (a)Cx:(x, Cy:(y, S)R)F is true on 𝔙 with a specific set of SAs 
(remember that on the truth-valuational semantics, we may add or eliminate singular 
arguments from our language). Then so are aC and (a, Cy:(y, S)R)F. But this means that 
Cy:(y, S)R has instances on 𝔙, and that for any of its instances c, (a, c)F is true on 𝔙. for any 
such c, since cCy:(y, S)R is true on 𝔙, cC and (c, S)R are true on 𝔙. And again, for any 
instance d of S on 𝔙, (c, d)R is true on 𝔙. 
On 𝔙, if b is an instance of Cy:(y, M)R, then both bC and (b, M)R are true on 𝔙. So for any 
instance e of M on 𝔙, (b, e)R is true on 𝔙. Now, if d is an instance of S on 𝔙, from the first 
premise of (73), SM, dM is also true on 𝔙, and therefore (b, d)R is true on 𝔙. So (b, S)R is 
also true on 𝔙. Since bC is also true, bCy:(y, S)R is true on 𝔙. But we saw that 
(a, Cy:(y, S)R)F is true on 𝔙. So (a, b)F is true on 𝔙.  
We see that inference (64) can be incorporated in an existing powerful version of Quarc. Moreover, 
in the process, Quarc has brought to light two features of Moss’s original formulation which needed 
to be addressed: completion of an ellipsis and making two presuppositions explicit. We therefore 
proved here a revised inference, (73). 
Comparative quantifiers 
74. More students than professors run 
More professors than deans run 
More students than deans run 
 The four kinds of inference we discussed above did not pose serious issues for their 
incorporation in Quarc, syntactically, semantically, or proof-theoretically. The active–passive-voice 
distinction and defining clauses were already incorporated in Quarc, the latter in a three-valued 
version of it; and conjunctive predicates and comparative adjectives required rather straightforward 
extensions for their incorporation. Comparative quantifiers, however, pose several challenges, only 
some of which will be met in this paper. 
 The quantifiers of Quarc,  and , translate Natural Language’s ‘some’, ‘a’, ‘all’, ‘any’ and ‘every’ 
in various of their uses. All these quantifiers are unary determiners: they attach to one general noun 
to form a noun phrase. ‘Some boys’, ‘a girl’, ‘all men’, ‘any woman’ and ‘every person’ are a few 
examples. This is also true of some other Natural Language quantifiers, for instance three, at least 
seven, infinitely many, most and many. Translating these quantifiers in Quarc will require additional 
vocabulary but not additional syntactic roles. 
 By contrast, comparative quantifiers, in their use exemplified in (74), are binary determiners: 
they attach to two general nouns to form a noun-phrase. As, for instance, in ‘more students than 
professors’ and ‘more professors than deans’ (Ben-Yami 2009). Translating them into Quarc will 
therefore necessitate an additional syntactic role: a quantifier which attaches to an ordered pair of 
one-place predicates to form a quantified argument. 
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Vocabulary and formulas 
We add a new binary quantifier, , read ‘more’. If P and Q are one-place predicates, then (P,Q) is a 
binary quantified argument. 
Semantics 
To capture the truth-conditions of ‘most’ within a truth-valuational substitutional semantics, as well 
as those of many other, unary quantifiers – e.g. ‘three’, ‘at least seven’, ‘many’ and ‘most’ – we 
should overcome a difficulty related to the fact that several names might name the same thing 
(Lewis 1985). Suppose we defined ‘Two men married Olivia Langdon’ as true if there are two 
different substitution instances of names for ‘two men’, each verifying ‘x is a man’, which yield a true 
sentence of the form, ‘x married Olivia Langdon’. We would then get that the sentence is true, for 
both ‘Mark Twain is a man’ and ‘Samuel Clemens is a man’ are true, as are ‘Mark Twain married 
Olivia Langdon’ and ‘Samuel Clemens married Olivia Langdon’. Yet Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens, 
and only this single man married Olivia Langdon. 
 To overcome this difficulty, we first define for each one-place predicate P on each valuation 𝔙 a 
maximal substitution set 𝔖. This is a set for which, 
• only names ‘a’ for which ‘aP’ is true on 𝔙 are in 𝔖 
• for any different a and b in 𝔖, a=b is false on 𝔙 
• for any c for which cP is true on 𝔙, a=c is true on 𝔙 for some a in 𝔖, possibly c itself. 
In this way we make sure that every P is counted exactly once, so to say, by the names in P’s 
maximal substitution set. It is easy to show that on each valuation, all maximal substitution sets of a 
given predicate have the same number of members, or cardinality. 
 We can now define the truth value of a formula φ[(P,Q)], governed by (P,Q), on a valuation 
𝔙. We consider two maximal substitution sets 𝔖P and 𝔖Q. φ[(P,Q)] is true on 𝔙 just in case more 
substitution cases of the form, φ[a/(P,Q)] with a ∈ 𝔖P are true on 𝔙 than such substitution 
instances with a ∈ 𝔖Q. 
 Turning to inference (74), we can formalise it and show the validity of the formalisation in Quarc. 
Its formalisation will be, 
75. ((S,P))R, ((P,D))R ⊨ ((S,D))R 
We have to show that if both premises are true on a valuation 𝔙, then so is the conclusion. We 
choose three maximal substitution sets on 𝔙, 𝔖S, 𝔖P and 𝔖D. If ((S,P))R is true on 𝔙, then there are 
more members a in 𝔖S for which aR is true on 𝔙 than members b in 𝔖P for which bR is true on 𝔙; 
and similarly, there are more such members b than members c of 𝔖D for which cR is true on 𝔙. So 
there are more members a in 𝔖S for which aR is true on 𝔙 than members c in 𝔖D for which cR is true 
on 𝔙. Accordingly, ((S,D))R is true on 𝔙. 
Proofs 
This is the part of the challenge comparative quantifiers pose which will not be met in this work. 
How is it possible to reflect the logic of the quantifier  in a proof system, is a question we shall here 
leave unanswered. In fact, even the more basic question, whether it is possible to capture content by 
form for  in argument–predicate sentences, will not be addressed here either. 
 To the best of my knowledge, Moss does not try to incorporate inference (74) or the quantifier 
‘more’, as used in argument–predicate sentences, in his Natural Logic systems (but see below on the 
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use of this quantifier in ‘existential’ sentences). In (Moss 2015), he mentions inference (74) in order 
to show the apparent inadequacy of first-order logic as a means of representing the logic of Natural 
Language: 
[In] the first-order language with one-place relations student(x), professor(x), and run(x), 
there is no first-order sentence φ with the property that for all (finite) models M, φ is true in 
M if and only if ‘More students than professors run’ is true in M in the obvious sense. This 
failure already suggests that first-order logic might not be the best “host logical system” for 
natural language inference. (p. 563) 
I agree with Moss on what he takes this inability to suggest. (See also (Ben-Yami 2009) for a 
discussion of generalised quantifiers and comparative quantifiers.) What we managed to show in 
this paper is that Quarc does not have this shortcoming as a system for representing the logic of 
Natural Language. Quarc can incorporate Natural Language’s comparative quantifiers as binary 
quantifiers, imitating their Natural Language syntax, and it does that by providing the correct truth 
conditions for these sentences. We saw this being done for ‘more’ with a truth-valuational 
substitutional semantics; the way to generalise this approach to other comparative quantifiers (e.g., 
‘at least as many’) or construct a model-theoretic semantics for them is straightforward. 
Accordingly, we have managed to show an advantage of Quarc over the Predicate Calculus in this 
respect. 
Comparative quantifiers in ‘existential’ sentences 
In more recent work, Moss and Topal extended Natural Logic and applied it to sentences of the 
form, ‘There are at least as many p as q’ and ‘There are more p than q’ (Moss 2016; Moss and Topal 
2018) (see footnote 3). They have developed sound and complete proof systems for cardinality 
comparisons, for both finite (Moss 2016) and infinite sets (Moss and Topal 2018). This is impressive 
work, and it would be interesting to inquire whether Quarc can deliver anything comparable. This, 
however, will not be attempted in this paper, for several reasons. 
 There are obvious space considerations. For instance, the proof system of (Moss 2016) contains 
24 rules, of which 16 involve his formalisations of ‘at least as many’ and ‘more’; the corresponding 
numbers for the proof system of (Moss and Topal 2018) are 21 and 12. Accordingly, a Quarc system 
formalising these inferences might involve significantly more additions than the extended systems 
considered above. Similarly, a completeness proof for this extended system would not be 
established by minor additions to the one provided in (Ben-Yami and Pavlovic unpublished). This is a 
topic for a separate paper. 
 Moreover, a Quarc treatment of sentences of the form, ‘There are at least as many p as q’ and 
‘There are more p than q’, will depart from Moss’s in some important fundamental respects. Moss 
formalises these sentences by sentences similar in form to those formalising ‘All/some p are/aren’t 
q’. For instance, ‘Some p are q’ is formalised by (p, q), and ‘There are more x than y’ by >(p, q). 
Namely, apart from the different quantifier, no syntactic distinction is drawn between the 
argument–predicate sentence, ‘Some p are q’, in which the argument is ‘some p’, and the so-called 
existential sentence, ‘There are x’, in which x is a noun phrase formed by a comparative quantifier, 
‘more p than q’. However, the existential sentence, ‘There are more p than q’ is no argument–
predicate one. A sentence similar to it in form using the quantifier ‘some’ will be, ‘There are some p’, 
and not, ‘Some p are q’. An argument–predicate sentence with the quantifier ‘more’ would have the 
form of the sentence considered above, ‘More students than professors run’. As mentioned earlier, 
Moss hasn’t developed a proof system for these sentences. 
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 The distinction between existential sentences and argument–predicate sentences seems to be a 
linguistic universal. Moreover, existential sentences show important differences from quantified 
argument–predicate ones (Ben-Yami 2004, sec. 6.5; Francez 2009; McNally 2011). Accordingly, a 
system that aims to be a logic for Natural Language informed by the latter’s syntax should formalise 
existential sentences differently than it does argument–predicate ones. It should distinguish the two 
constructions and explore the logical relations between them. As part of such a general treatment of 
existential sentences, those with a noun-phrase of the form ‘more p than q’ as their pivot (see 
(Francez 2009; McNally 2011) for the terminology) can also be introduced and discussed, as well as 
those with other comparative quantifiers. A general inquiry into the logic and formalisation of 
existential sentences has not been attempted by Moss and shall not be attempted here either. 
Conclusions and future work 
This paper tried to assess the ability of Quarc, in its current or extended versions, to represent the 
kinds of inference which have served as the basis of Moss’s constructions of Natural Logic systems. 
We have shown how Quarc can incorporate, sometimes with some extensions, passive–active voice 
distinctions, conjunctive predicates (see and hear), comparative adjectives (taller), and defining 
clauses (who respect all mammals). All these were incorporated within sound and complete systems. 
We have also shown how Quarc can be syntactically extended to incorporate comparative 
quantifiers (more … than …) and provided a semantics but not a proof system for this extension. 
 All this was done by using a language with a syntax close to that of Natural Language. In this 
respect we followed Moss’s dictum for his Natural Logic project, ‘logic for natural language, logic in 
natural language’ (Moss 2015, 563). I believe that in some respects we improved on Natural Logic, 
for instance by not using negative nouns. 
 The process also helped shed light on some of the inferences we discussed. The constraints of 
the formal system brought us to recognise an ellipsis and presuppositions involved in the conclusion 
of inference (64), ‘All who fear all who respect all skunks fear all who respect all mammals’. 
 A main aim of the Natural Logic project which we did not address here was the question of 
decidability. Apart from the theoretical interest, this is relevant to questions of the applicability of 
computer programmes for determining validity. I hope this question will be addressed in future 
work, by myself or others. 
 Another topic which was not addressed in this paper but which has engaged Natural Logic is that 
of monotonicity (Moss 2015, sec. 4). Moss’s work is based on van Benthem’s (1986; 1991), which 
generated additional inquiries as well (see (van Benthem 2008) for a historical survey). Whether and 
how can Quarc analyse the phenomena of monotonicity is again left for future work. 
 The last topic mentioned as subject for future work is the formalisation of the so-called 
existential sentences – ‘There are x’ – in Quarc. Once this is done, existential sentences with 
comparative quantifiers – ‘There are more p than q’ and ‘There are at least as many p as q’ – can also 
be formalised, and Moss’s work on these last sentences can be comparatively studied. 
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 So, there is still work to be done. Yet hopefully, we have shown that in addition to the earlier 
successes in its application to the analysis of the logic of Natural Language, Quarc can also represent 
the inferences that motivated Moss’s Natural Logic.4  
 
4 The research leading to this work was supported by the funding programme, Research Stays for University 
Academics, 2018 (57381327), of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), and by the Senior Fellowship 
programme of the Edelstein Center, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 
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